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Complicity:
An Introduction to Andrea Dworkin,
"Abortion," Chapter 3,
Right-Wing Women
New York: Perigee, 1983
Catharine A. MacKinnor*
Most women who seek abortions became pregnant while having
sexual intercourse with men. The abortion debate, in contrast to women's
experience, has separated control over reproduction from control over
sexuality, and both from gender. The Left supports the availability of the
abortion choice as if women just happened upon the fetus. The Right
imagines that intercourse precedes conception only to urge abstinence, as
if sex were up to women, while defending male authority, including the
wifely duty to submit. At least some state statutes,' and some opponents
of public funding for abortions,2 would allow what they otherwise prohibit
if the pregnancy results from rape or incest-exceptions for special
occasions on which women presumptively did not control sex. Abor-
tion's proponents and opponents seem to share the tacit assumption that
women significantly do control sex.
Impregnated in a gang rape,3 Jane Roe sued to be able to end that
pregnancy without being a criminal in the eyes of the state of Texas.' Her
victory in Roe v. Wade' has been defended as giving women some say
*Catharine A. MacKinnon teaches sex discrimination and constitutional law at the
University of Minnesota Law School.
I. As of 1973, ten states that made abortion a crime had exceptions for rape and incest; at
least three had exceptions for rape only. Many of these exceptions were based on Model
Penal Code § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). quotedin Doe v. Bolton. 410 U.S. 179,
app. B 205-07 (1973), permitting abortion, inter alia, in cases of "rape, incest, or other
felonious intercourse." References to states with incest and rape exceptions can be found in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 140 n. 37 (1973).
2. Some versions of the Hyde Amendment. which prohibits use of public money to fund
abortions, have contained exceptions for cases of rape or incest. Pub. L No. 95-205, § 101,
91 Stat. 1460 (1977); Pub. L No. 95-480. § 210.92 Stat. 1567, 1586 (1978); Pub. L No.
96-123, § 109.93 Stat. 923.926 (1979); Pub. L No. 96-536, § 109,94 Stat. 3166,3170
(1980). All require immediate reporting of the incident.
3. Jane Roe'Says She'd Fight Abortion Battle Again, Minneapolis Star & Tribune, Jan.
22, 1983, at A3, col. 1.
4. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § § 1191-1194, 1196 (Vernon 1961).
5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), did not simply decriminalize abortion, it legalized it:
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over matters of life and death, including our own. It has been vilified as
authorizing an American holocaust and (what may be worse) as "bad
Constitutional law . . . not Constitutional law."' Never until this
analysis by Andrea Dworkin has abortion policy been confronted in the
context of the way women get pregnant, meaning as a consequence of
intercourse under conditions of gender inequality, meaning as an issue of
forced sex. Not until now has there been an account of Roe v. Wade as
male ideology.' How does this case, its possibility and its particularities,
emerge from the male perspective and serve male interests, even as it
saves women from desperation and butchery?' Might the doctrinal choice
of privacy, as opposed (for instance) to sex equality, appear appropriate
to abortion's link to heterosexuality? Here, as with so many other issues,
reading Andrea Dworkin feels like feminism for the first time.
The blunt elegant precision of Andrea Dworkin's arguments, the
clarity and sweep of her vision, the compelling urgency of her voice, have
moved women for nearly a decade. Woman Hating (1974) exposed the
misogynist core of the practicesthat define gender female across cultures.
"Footbinding did not emphasize the difference between men and
women-it created them."' The analysis underlying her collected speeches,
that is, it eliminated the crime of abortion in a way that prepared for its state regulation.
6. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale LJ. 920, 947
(1973) (emphasis in orignal). Should irony fail here- I mean to criticize the elevation of
methodological notions of proper Constitutional construction (purported always to be
nonsubstantive) above substantive outcomes. For other criticisms of Roe v. Wade see A.
Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government 113 (1976) (Roe "read[s]
like a set of hospital rules and regulations"); Tribe. The Supreme Court. 1972 Term-
Forwar" Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 Harv. L Rev. 1,
3 n.13 (1973); Glen, Abortion in the Courts: A Laywoman's Historical Guide to the New
DisasterArea, 4 Feminist Studies 1 (1978).
7. This is not to suggest that the decisionshould have gone the other way, or to propose
individual hearings to determine coercion prior to allowing abortions. Nor is it to criticize
Justice Blackmun, author of the majority opinion in Roe, who undoubtedly saw legalizing
abortion as a way to help women out of a desperate situation, which it has done.
8. Not funding poor women's abortions with public money, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980), is consistent with this analysis of the male commitment to the abortion right,
qualified to the point of nonexistence for poor/women of color whose sexual refusal never
has counted. As Justice Blackmun observed in a dissent to three earlier abortion
cases."[there is another world 'out there.' the existence of which the Court, I suspect, either
chooses to ignore or fears to recognize. . . . This is a sad day for those who regard the
Constitution as a force that would serve justice to all evenhandedly and, in so doing, would
better the lot of the poorest among us." Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 463 (1977). Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), and Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting in all three cases). See also Justice Blackmun's dissent in Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 348, and A. Dworkin, Right-Wing Women 89-99 (Perigee paperback ed.
1983) [hereinafter cited as Right-Wing Women].
9. A. Dworkin, Woman Hating 103 (1974).
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Our Blood (1976),t0 comes to full expression in the monumental
Pornography: Men Possessing Women (1981), perhaps the most
important book of this wave of feminism. " Pornography is not harmless
fantasy or a corrupt and confused misrepresentation of otherwise natural
healthy eroticism. It represents the sexuality of male supremacy, which
fuses the erotization of dominance and submission with the social
construction of male and female. Gender is sexual; pornography consti-
tutes the meaning of that sexuality. Men's power over women means that
the way men see women defines who women can be. Pornography is that
way.
Right- Wing Women (1983)," the book from which the following
unabridged excerpt is taken, applies and extends these insights. To show
how women of the Right are women in the feminist sense is to show how
antifeminism-the politics of contempt for women as a class-like
feminism, is a woman's response to women's situation. Dworkin accord-
ingly needs to analyze what women's situation is. Its wholeness has never
been so coherent, its outrage more luminous. The Right appeals to fears
that feminism makes rationaL The Right offers the better deal in a
universe men control. In a world of unpredictable and (they assume)
unchangeable male violence, women need protection. Their loyalty is the
price of that protection. Right-wing women's instincts for survival
produce a protective repulsion from feminists, whose call to freedom
looks like open season on women." The same sense of self-preservation
supports a choice of one man over many, an insistence on rules in the faith
that men can be held accountable to them, a love for Jesus as the perfect
man who will not violate or leave them if they submit. Knowing that
women do not control access to our sexuality, knowing forced sex is sex,
women of the Right oppose abortion because it removes the one thing men
value women for and the one thing that makes men responsible to women
for sex: babies. "Right-wing women are not wrong." 14
10. A. Dworkin, Our Blood: Prophesies and Discourses on Sexual Politics (1976) (reissued
in paperback, Perigee, 1981).
11. A. Dworkin. Pornography: Men Possessing Women (1981).
12. Right-Wing Women, supra note 8. Page numbers in this Introduction refer to the
paperback edition.
13. The new generation can brag all it wants about the new liberation of the new morality,
but it is still the woman who is hurt the most. The new morality isn't just a'fad'-it is a cheat
and a thief. It robs the woman of her virtue, her youth, her beauty, and her love-for
nothing, just nothing." P. Schlafly. The Power of the Positive Woman 16 (1977).
14. Right-Wing Women, supra note 8. at 68-69. See also: "Wifeorwhore .. . This is the
question right-wing womenface." (emphasis added), id. at 62; "Feminists have refused to
face the fact that equal pay for equal work is impossible as long as men rule women. and
right-wing women have refused to forget it." id. at 67; in reference to thesex-class system,"
id. at 236; "are right-wing women essentially right that it is indestructible." id at 237.
1983]
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The terms of the struggle for reproductive freedom, Dworkin
shows, have not included a right to refuse sex. At most they have rested
upon an implied right to have sex, to be sexual, as if the fact that the
definition and terms of sexuality 5 are not ours can be ignored out of
existence. As Susan Sontag put it, "The question is: what sexuality are
women to be liberated to enjoy? . . . Sex as such is not liberating for
women. Neither is more sex." 16 In this light, the abortion right has been
part of the movement for sexual liberation in the sense of securing
heterosexual expression for women on the same terms as men: without
consequences. Under conditions of gender inequality, such an abortion
right not only saves women from butchery, it frees male sexual
aggression. Women of the Left focus only the former need; women of the
Right see only the latter danger. Refusing selective blindness, Andrea
Dworkin sees that the abortion right appears as a moment in the liberation
of women just as it becomes a moment in the subordination of women-
progress, but the exact opposite of change. Giving men more control over
sex meant giving women more control over reproduction, most of which
reverted to doctors, husbands, fathers, or is in the process of being
reclaimed by the state through regulation."' This, surely, must be what is
meant by reform.
We need to understand how dominance becomes more entrenched
with each advance against it; how each reach toward empowerment turns
to powerlessness in our hands; how every improvement makes the
condition of women less unbearable but seemingly never changed.
Pursuing Dworkin's substantive challenges to law and policy is a
beginning. If the home, men's refuge, is the place of battery, marital rape,
and women's exploited labor, "that open grave where so many women
15. 1 did not say "that sexuality" but rather simply "sexuality" for a reason. The reason is
not to essentialize sexuality, but to define it according to its social meaning, a relational and
specific rather than essentialist concept. It is to make the point that to deal with "that
sexuality" that male power constructs is to deal with "sexuality" itself. Sexuality, in this
view, is a social construct. This approach expresses a substantive account of male
dominance. In male dominant societies, a term which describes most if not all societies, men
make dominant meanings in their own interest. The social meaning of the sexual relation,
that is of sexuality itsetf in such societies, fuses eroticism with power. Under such
conditions, sexuality defines a major part of what power itself means. This power relation-
this meaning of sexuality-is fused, again by its social meaning, with gender. This becomes
what gender means, gender also being a construct of its social meaning. How to account for
divergent meanings imagined by powerless people, how specifically to account for an
experience or possiblity of sexual freedom for women without changing these conditions,
is a real question. What can freedom mean under conditions of inequality?
16. Sontag, The Third World of Women, 40 Partisan Review 188 (1973) (order
reversed).
17. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 651 F. 2d 1198 (6th Cir.
1981), cerl. granted. 102 S.CL 2266 (1982) (No. 81-746).
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hide waiting to die,"18 what (if the law of privacy, which protects the
sanctity of that same place, those same relations. that same private
sphere? If "women live in a system in which sex is forced on them and the
sex is intercourse,"' 9 if" . . . passive acquiescence is the standard in
normal intercourse [so] it becomes proof of consent in rape," 0 what of the
consent defense? What of the rape law altogether? If pornography silences
women, denies women speech, what good is the first amendment? If the
anti-abortionist agenda leads to sterilization of women "undesirables," if
welfare laws exploit women's bodies on "the farming model,"' 1 will due
process of law be sufficient? What are the implications of Dworkin's
insistence upon "one absolute standard of human dignity"22 for the law of
equal protection?
Ri iht- Wing Women combines deep policy analysis with compel-
ling advocac) and connects an analysis of sexual domination with racism
and economic exploitation. An exemplary act of feminism, this book is as
much to women as about us. On the surface Andrea Dworkin's most
conventionally political book, Right- Wing Women is a subtle discourse
on complicity. By showing how women of the Right are destroyed in order
that they be saved, she faces all women's survival stake in the system that
is killing us.
18. Dworkin, The Bruise That Doesn't Heal, 3 Mother Jones 36 (July 1978).
19. Right-Wing Women, supra note 8, at 80.
20. Right-Wing Women, supra note 8, at 86.
21. U. at 174-75, 184-88.
22. Id. at 216. See also iL at 216-20.
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